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Book reviews 
Donald A. Sch6n and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection. Towards the Resolution 
of Intractable Policy Controversies. New York: Basic Books, 1994. 247 pp. 
This interesting and important book is a valuable contribution to what 
Fischer and Forester (1993) have called the argumentative turn in policy 
analysis. Like other authors in this emerging perspective, Sch6n and Rein are 
uncomfortable with the practice of mainstream policy analysis. But unlike 
many other authors of the argumentative school, they do not exhaust them- 
selves in political and methodological criticism (cf. Durning, 1995; Sabatier, 
1995). On the contrary, the merit of this book is that the authors eriously try 
to sketch the contours of a coherent alternative. To the decisionism and 
instrumental rationality of analysis as science, Rein and Sch6n oppose the 
Deweyan pragmatism and design rationality of analysis as frame-refecfive 
argument. In their view, prominently expressed in the book's subtitle, design- 
rational policy analysis is the way the policy science community can respond 
effectively to '...the need to develop acapability for reflective conversation i  
policy design in order to effectively deal with policy controversy' (p. 204). 
The practical orientation in Frame Reflection clearly derives from its 
authors' previous work. Both have come to their critical views not (merely) 
through epistemological reflection in academic settings. Martin Rein's earlier 
work on social policy and social service delivery systems has led him to 
understand the importance of 'framing' and 'naming' in policy practice. To 
deal effectively with confusing problematic situations, practitioners selective- 
ly train attention on aspects and dimensions that, through generative meta- 
phors, can easily be named. At the same time, such story-telling practices 
frame the way the problem is experienced and cognitively defined. The result 
is a 'frame,' a cluster of inextricably intertwined causal and normative beliefs 
'on which people and institutions draw in order to give meaning, sense, and 
normative direction to their thinking and action in policy matters' (p, xiii). In 
normal or mild policy disagreements, frames are shared or, at least, overlap 
sufficiently for ordinary problem solving strategies to work effectively. How- 
ever, messy and apparently unstructurable problems involving the contradic- 
tory certainties of conflicting frames require a different approach to problem 
solving: 'Participants in [frame-reflective d sign], must be able to put them- 
selves in the shoes of other actors in the environment, and they must have a 
complementary ability to reflect on their own action frames: they must over- 
come the blindness induced by their own ways of framing the policy situation' 
(p. 187). Chapter four on early retirement in Germany well illustrates both 
the empirical plausibility of conflicting policy frames that generate a policy 
dialectic between those unwilling to listen to one another, and the necessity 
for more frame-critical nalysis. 
But what is frame-reflective analysis? Here we turn to what I see as Donald 
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Schtn's vital input. In his earlier The Reflective Practitioner (1983), Sch6n has 
formulated the principles of a design method that fundamentally challenges 
Herbert Simon's widely accepted views on the subject in The Sciences of the 
Artificial (1969). 1Simon's design science basically derives from the optimiza- 
tion method iscovered inoperations research: By refraining a practical prob- 
lem in line with the scientific story lines of objective functions, constraints, 
and control variables, the analyst can calculate an optimal solution. In the 
case of complex, difficult to structure problems, methods of decomposition 
allow the transformation f the whole problem into subproblems that, sepa- 
rately, lend themselves tooptimization. These views also underlie most of the 
methods and techniques taught at many schools of policy analysis. 
Schtn depicts design as a typical Deweyan strategy of inquiry that shuttles 
back and forth between theory and practice. This reflection-in-action controls 
the action and corrects the thinking and, thus, feeds both. It is a continuous 
dialectical, iterative process between the designer, the design, and the en- 
vironment in which the design is supposed to have intended effects, inde- 
pendent from the designer. The design process is not a straightforward analyt- 
ic one. Rather, it is a matter of creatively responding to the factual uncertain- 
ties and the normative ambiguities of an ever-changing reality. The creative 
response of the reflective designer has two roots. On the one hand, the de- 
signer uses accumulated stocks of professional knowledge. These consist of 
what Rein has called flames, that is~ specific disciplinary languages, reper- 
toires, appreciative systems and dominant overarching theories. On the other 
hand, there is the designer's skill in what Sehtn calls 'double visioff in frame- 
experiments. The designer, in Sch6n's words, 'must hold himself open to the 
situation's backtalk .... He must act in accordance with the view adopted, but 
he must recognize that he can always break it open later.... Double vision 
does not require [the designer] to stop and think, but the capacity to keep 
alive, in the midst of action, a multiplicity of views of the situation' (1983: pp. 
164, 281). It is exactly at this point that Rein's ideas about frame-critical poli- 
cy analysis and Sehtn's ideas about he reflective practitioner blend in fruitful 
synthesis. Frame-reflective analysis and design rationality - the key concepts 
in Frame Reflection - are to the 'compleat' policy analyst what double vision 
is for the reflective practitioner. 
Using the failure story of Project Athena at MIT (chapter five) and the suc- 
cess story, of homelessness in Massachusetts (chapter six), Schtn and Rein 
show how design rationality critically depends on the capacity for frame- 
reflection (chapter seven). In a nutshell, this means that (1) designers are able 
to reflect on the meaning of the changing problematic situation for their origi- 
nal framing of the problem, that is, they reframe it; (2) they are able to under- 
stand the frame conflicts underlying their dilemmas and controversies; and 
(3) they are even able to reflect on the blockage of the policy process itself, 
leading to creative ways to un-block it (cf. Diesing, 1962, on political rational- 
ity). In a final chapter, Schtn and Rein suggest what their theory means for the 
policy analysis curriculum and research agenda. Further development of their 
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ideas requires optimally distant research settings in which academics and 
practitioners engage in situated causal inquiry and on-the-spot experiments. 
This would lead not to an empirically tested, generalizable battery of tech- 
niques for guaranteed successful practice, but to a reflective transfer of a 
usable repertoire of unique cases. 
So far I have made no secret of my praise for the book. But this does not 
mean there are no avenues for serious criticism. Often, Sch6n and Rein cloud 
the meaning of vital ideas in (intended?) conceptual fuzziness. Also, they are 
so deep into elaborating their own thoughts, that they neglect convergent, 
sometimes conceptually more advanced, strands of thinking. Examples are 
the extensive literatures on the nature of public policy problems, policy belief 
systems, cultural theory, and policy networks or advocacy coalitions. Further, 
the principles of frame-reflective analysis (apart from their partial grounding 
in Sch6n's earlier observations) are derived from just one case. The claim 
(which has given the book its enticing and ambitious ubtitle) that frame- 
reflective analysis is the appropriate way to resolve intractable controversies, 
is unconvincing. First, because, apart from the German early retirement case, 
the other two cases do not strike me as serious political controversies. Rather, 
they concern routinely conflicting bureaucratic-institutional frames. Second, 
and more important, for a political scientist, Sch6n and Rein barely scratch 
the surface in analyzing the political conditions for frame-reflection to have 
any chance of succeeding. The main political condition they mention, suffi- 
cient mutual trust among top-level appointed policymakers (1994: pp. 179- 
180), is at best necessary, but certainly not sufficient. The analysis of political 
conditions also betrays an implicit elitist bias. In that sense, Sch6n and Rein 
are closer to the policy management tradition than they care to admit. 
In spite of its conceptual nd methodological vulnerabilities, Frame Reflec- 
tion is a must for those interested in using the argumentative turn in the em- 
pirical study of policy processes, or in developing a fully fledged alternative to
mainstream policy analysis and design. 
Notes 
1. I owe this insight o a research memorandum on the development ofa social science-based 
design methodology by three colleagues from Twente University, A. Rip, E Van Vught, and 
J. Moonen. 
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Frank Fischer, Evaluating Public Policy. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1995, 296 pp. 
In his new book Frank Fischer continues his attacks on what he calls the 
'positivist approach' to public policy. In comparison to his last book Technoc- 
racy and the Politics of Expeuise (1990), Fischer has both concretized and 
developed his criticism. He is guided by three goals: First, he presents the 
epistemological foundations of a more comprehensive approach than posi- 
tivism provides for the evaluation of public policy. Second, in confronting the 
positivist policy approach with the concerns of the environmental movement, 
Fischer gives the outline of a 'critical public policy' which leads to a closer 
relationship between policy analysis and radical democracy. Third, in order to 
make his 'postposifivist approach' (p. 233) more accessible to scholars and 
pracfioners, he presents detailed case studies in which he illustrates the dif- 
ferent levels of policy program evaluation. 
Fischer, begins his argument by questioning the criteria upon which a poli- 
tical community should base its public policy decisions. According to Fischer, 
sufficient answers to evaluative questions force public policy analysts to 
attack the 'narrow technocratic orientation of conventional policy evaluation' 
(p. 17). In contrast, one has to broaden both the scope of significant criteria 
and the number of relevant participants involved in policy evaluations. As the 
line of Fischer's argument goes, both broadenings are necessarily intercon- 
nected. 
This broadening of the relevant criteria is part of a four-level-model of
policy deliberation. In order for a policy evaluation to be considered as suffi- 
cient, it must satisfy the particular requirements of all four levels (p. 216). Dif- 
ferent ypes of discourses take place in the four levels of Fischer's model. The 
first level, Program Verification, addresses the technical-analytical aspects of a 
certain policy program (pp. 27-45). Its main concerns are to what extent a 
particular policy program empirically fullfilled its stated objectives. For exam- 
ple, did a program which was designed in order to reduce negative ffects by 
indMdual traffic in region X lead to the originally expected outcomes? In 
order to answer questions of verification, experimental program research, 
cost-effectiveness analysis, and risk-benefit analysis are the most appropriate 
research methods. However, on a second level policy analysts are already 
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forced to rely on less rigid methods. Situational Validation is a contextual dis- 
course which focuses on whether or not the particular program objectives are 
indeed relevant o the situation. For example, does the reduction of air pol- 
lution caused by individual traffic really provide a sufficient criterion to 
measure the success of the particular program (rather than traffic-noise)? 
Validation examines the assumptions and conceptualizations which underlie 
the situation a particular policy program attempts to influence. Policy prob- 
lems are not given facts but constructed social artefacts. Thus the policy ana- 
lyst cannot escape political struggles over a problem definition. 
One way to cope with this struggle over problem definitions is to shift to 
the third level, Societal Vindication. Here the evaluation focuses on the task 
of deciding 'whether apolicy goal is or is not compatible with or instrumental 
to the existing societal arrangements' (p. 111). The criteria of judgment are 
immanent to an existing societal system. The question to be raised is whether 
a particular policy goal has value for a societal system as a whole. Of special 
importance are the political-economic mechanisms for achieving a particular 
society's core goods (wealth, power, freedom, justice, etc). For example, to 
what extent do the negative conomic effects of blocking individual traffic in 
inner cities harm (or benefit) the well-being of a society, as a whole? The 
chosen criterion, however, can be highly contested. Thus, at a fourth level 
Fischer moves to a mode of analysis he coins Social Choice. 
Evaluating in terms of Social Choice basically means to deal with questions 
of moral and ethical world views, since they frame the judgments on particu- 
lar policy programs and even the interpretations of empirical data. Some 
opponents of traffic regulation, for instance, do hold strong views on individ- 
ual rights and the limits of the collectivity's competence to set rules. At the 
fourth level, thc policy analyst nearly slips into the shoes of a political phi- 
losopher. One has to come to terms with the fact that very often the under- 
lying controversies in debates on public policy are actually about he dashing 
of different ideals or world views; therefore one has to address questions such 
as the internal logic of world views, their consistency, ortheir moral value. 
In order to meet he requirements of all four levels, policy analysis has to 
give up its insistence on pure empirical and analytical methods and turn 
towards a 'multimethodological' (pp. 17, 228) scheme. Fischer calls for an 
integration of four major methodological orientations in the social sciences 
which correspond to his four levels of analysis: empirical means/end analysis, 
phenomenological social science, system analysis, and political philosophy. 
To each of the four levels Fischer adds one extensive case study describing 
the debates over a particular policy program. Fischer uses four examples: the 
early evaluation of the Head Start Program ha the 1970s; New York Times 
Square redevelopment studies in the 1980s; disability policy goals until the 
early 1990s; and the recent green critique of so-called 'technocratic ideology.' 
Each example is well chosen with respect o Fischer's argumentative goal. 
Each case indicates how the focus of evaluation shifted from one level to the 
next during the controversies. According to Fischer, this imler dynamic is 
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inevitable: the controversies over Head Start finally led policy analysts to 
broaden their evaluation criteria from Program Verification to a long-term 
oriented Situational Validation; advocates of disability rights won their case 
during the Bush presidency because they were able to shift the line of evalua- 
tion from Societal Vindication to the realm of moral claims. 
The reader might ask, why make the job of a policy analyst even more diffi- 
cult than it already is? Struggling to get the exact data and keeping the com- 
puter programs rtmning seem tough enough. Why not try to avoid involving 
oneself in highly politized and messy debates by merely sticking to hard 
empirical data? Fischer's implicit response is twofold: On the one hand, he 
gives evidence for the emergence of a set of new policy problems which pri- 
marily fall into the domain of level four; on the other hand, he questions the 
traditional division between citizens and experts. Here his basic argument can 
be rephrased into the following statement: 'Listen, even if you do not follow 
my methodological criticism of positivsm, you are forced to broaden the 
scope of your criteria of evaluation anyway. Look at the realities, my dear 
friend of empirical findings: The public doesn't rust your technocratic ap- 
proach anymore!' According to Fischer there is a set of modern policy prob- 
lems which have an inevitable dynamic forcing political scientists to include 
the fourth level of evaluation. Following Ulrich Beck's Risk Society, he de- 
scribes modern societies as having reached a stage of development in which 
the traditional approach to policy has lost its merits in the eyes of the public. 
This is primarily due to the tremendous emergence of environmental ques- 
tions. It is not just the appearance ofnew problems but the emergence of so 
many at the same time, such as the depletion of the ozone layer, nuclear radia- 
tion, the green-house effect, polluted water and air, or toxic waste. Citizens' 
reactions to these risks affect policy programming and implementation direct- 
ly. The increase of ecological risks has resulted, for example, ha the well 
known phenomenon ofNIMBY as a major stumbling block for dealing with 
environmental problems (p. 179). Experience from the 1980s indicate that 
the positivst response failed to convince political actors who are apprehensive 
about risky programs. They remain skeptical since they perceive the manner 
in which experts think as already too deeply embedded in the design and 
practices of a technocratic society. The neglect of public policy expertise is a 
serious challenge not only to dangerous projects but to any necessary and rea- 
sonable public policy program. In order to come to terms with NIMBY prob- 
lems, public policy has to deal with the fact that they are an intertwind mix of 
technical and social problems. 
Thus policy analysts have to meet he concerns of citizens in the procedures 
of 'participatory democracy' (p. 192). Participatory democracy rests upon the 
idea of bridging the gap between policy analysts and citizens through 'partici- 
patory research' (p. 199). If the role of the political expert were to change, citi- 
zens would not be hostile to technical data per se. The expert has to be rede- 
fined as a 'faciliator' of public learning and public empowerment. No longer 
should the policy analyst be the privileged expert in technical verification. 
75 
Instead the analyst urns into an 'expert in how people learn, clarify, and 
decide for themselves' (p. 223). Faced with the public distrust in technical 
expertise, only an participatory democracy reenables modern democratic 
societies to come to policy decisions at all. 
Fischer's critique of the positivist approach to public policy is well present- 
ed and convincing. With regard to the more practical consequences, however, 
his own 'postpositivist approach' still raises a few questions. Fischer is com- 
mitted to Habermas' idea of a 'broader-than-positivist' ra ionality. With 
regard to policy questions, the broadening approach may work well in cases in 
which the opponents at least agree over the fact on which questions they dis- 
agree. In times of ideological clashes, however - and some environmental 
issues Fischer mentions like nature's intrinsic value and animal rights (p. 166) 
or the appropriate level of riskiness for the fullfillment of the good life 
(p. 177) - it is easier to agree on some brute data than on basic moral claims. 
One does not have to be an advocate of postmodernism to be skeptical about 
the reasoning force of political deliberation alone. Policy deliberation eeds 
appropriate institutional settings to unfold the communicative rationality on 
which Fischer insists against postmodern claims (p. 237). 
If we consider the important role 'participatory democracy' plays in his 
argument, Fischer is surprisingly vague on the question of its institutional out- 
look. At some point he adds that 'not every one must - or even can - partici- 
pate in all matters' (p. 224). But the reader cannot find more on this issue 
than a general reference to Dryzek's concept of 'discursive design' (p. 210). 
Fischer mainly draws on the waste facility case in Alberta, Canada. Here the 
NIMBY syndrome was overcome by a participatory political process (p. 197). 
I do not know enough about his special case in order to judge Fischer's inter- 
pretation. From the theoretical need for participatory research, however, it 
does not neccesarily follow that it will fulfil its expectations in practice. There 
can occur, for instance, some yet unknown side-effects. In other words: 
Fischer's 'critical public policy' approach needs ome public policy evaluation 
itself. Although I am sympathetic to Fischer's participatory approach (and 
thus agree with him on the fourth level of his evaluative scheme), I think that 
so far there is not enough empirical evidence (collected either on level one, 
two, or three) which can justify his high expectations. As he puts it himself, 
case studies do not produce definitive answers (p. 79). This is especially true 
when we look at the limited number of case studies from which he draws his 
argument. The positive outcome of Alberta, for instance, may be due to very 
specific ircumstances. There are, on the other hand, quite a few current cases 
in which the participatory approach failed to come to simply any result at all. 
Frank Fischer has written a theoretically convincing work redefining public 
policy analysis. However, it is now up to further research to find concrete 
institutional designs which foster participatory democracy. 
Reviewed by Hubertus Buchstein, Assistant Professor, Freie Universit~it Ber- 
lin, Fachbereich Polltische Wissenschaft, Berlin, Germany. 
Policy Sciences 29: 76, 1996. 
Daniel Press, Democratic Dilemmas in the Age of Ecology: Trees and Toxics in 
the American West. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994. 
For many years now there has been a debate regarding the complex relation- 
ship between ecologically-based stringency and the quality of democratic 
practice. The 1970s saw some wild claims about the need for an ecological 
philosopher king. I myself have always seen that as both unnecessary and a 
matter of foolish optimism regarding the type of 'philosopher' likely to be 
granted unrestrained power in more ecologically desperate times than we 
presently face. More likely he/she would make James Watt look like a cross 
between St. Francis of Assissi and Aldo Leopold. Democracy isthe best hope 
the environment is going to get. 
In more recent years most analysts have come to see this, and more (e.g., 
Dryzek, Hajer) have sought o explore how simultaneously to enhance both 
democratic practice and ecological protection. There is likely to be more lit- 
erature in this vein appearing on the horizon. Daniel Press has done some- 
thing here that should prove to be very useful, within political science, policy 
analysis, and the wider society. He has looked at real cases in the context of an 
attempt o render more precise the concerns within the aforementioned 
debate. 
Press reviews the debate intelligently and sorts it out in an interesting way. 
He really does a service in linking theoretically (and pofitically) important 
questions with empirical research. Doing this sort of thing is why the recent 
work of Robert Putnam is so widely regarded and interesting. Press isn't Put- 
ham (he's much younger, I think), but he is on the same track as was, for that 
matter, Robert Dahl ha Who Governs ? Empirical research can be either point- 
less or important depending in the first instance on the ability of the research- 
er to ask important questions. My sense is still that a great many empirically- 
oriented social scientists do not ask such questions because they do not know 
what is important either within the world of political and social theory or 
within the real world. Daniel Press does pose important concerns and is quite 
clear both in expressing those concerns and in ratcheting them down to ques- 
tions he can at least partially answer. 
The book focuses, as the title suggests, on two cases: the siting of hazar- 
dous waste treatment facilities (in California) and the limitation of cutting in 
old growth forests (in California and Oregon). Press conducted a substantial 
number of moderately intensive interviews with some of the people centrally 
involved in some specific decisions regarding these two important issues. His 
choice of issues was excellent because they are important in many other juris- 
dictions and because they provide a sharp point of contrast with each other as 
regards his central concerns: the strengths and weaknesses of locally-rooted 
democratic participation. 
The conclusion is both interesting and worrisome, as one might expect. 
Local communities can and will almost always resist the siting of new toxics 
treatment facilities and will (or would if they could) most often favor dis- 
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patching standing forests in more rapid fashion than might the citizens (or 
government agencies or courts) elsewhere inthe state or the nation. But this is 
not in itseff grotmds to fear (or to fear for) local democracy. As Press puts it 
(p. 130): %1though the environmental effects of clearcutting and toxic spills 
may be profound, trees and toxics controversies are not 'loaded' with the kind 
of urgency that characterizes a famine, or a flood, or the ozone hole. Thus, the 
panic and perception of crisis that Ophuls (1977) and Heilbroner (1980) 
believed would drive authoritarian politics has not materialized in these nvi- 
ronmental issues; on the contrary, grass-roots participants involved in these 
issues are increasing their participation and resisting various forms of co- 
optation, or centralized view." 
Environmentalists reached 'up' to more centralized established ecision- 
making before searching for other, more NIMBY-like forms and styles of 
protest. Some pcrsons within industry and many nonenvironmentalists n 
forest-industry dependent communities were seemingly open to compromise. 
This can only be more true as second growth forests become more widely 
available within North America (though we are not there yet). Press con- 
cludes with intelligent analysis and some practical suggestions (e.g., following 
Mazmanian and Morell). As well, he offers a brief, but insightful afterward 
that is more theoretically and politically oriented. 
Reviewed by Robert Paehlke, Professor, Environmental nd Resource Studies 
Program and Department of Political Studies, Trent University, Peter- 
borough, Ontario, Canada. 
